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CORPORATE LAW-FREEZE-OUT MERGERS-Freeze-out of mi
nority stockholders must have a "valid business purpose"-Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), and Tanzer v. Interna
tional General Industries, Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
In two recent cases the Supre~e Court of Delaware has
granted significantly greater rights to minority stockholders in
freeze-out mergers l than were previously allowed. The cases repre
sent a significant change in corporate law in Delaware and may be
forerunners of a new judicial approach to the investigation of the
motives behind corporate mergers.
In Singer v. Magnavox CO.,2 the Supreme Court of Delaware
announced a "valid business purpose" test. The test is to be
applied in corporate freeze-outs of minority stockholders when pub
licly held corporations "go private" by merger with another corpo
ration, both corporations being under the control of the same
majoritr stockholder. The "valid business purpose" test requires
that there be some acceptable business reason for the merger other
than eliminating an unwanted minority.
The principle that majority stockholders have a fiduciary duty
to minority stockholders in some situations has long been ac

1. In the freeze-out merger, the majority stockholders cause the corporation in
which the minority stockholders have an interest to merge with another corporation
controlled by the majority stockholders. In the merger the majority receives addi
tional shares in the surviving or resulting corporation while the minority stockhold
ers receive cash for their shares. The final result is that the majority gains all of the
equity interest in the corporation while the minority is "frozen-out." In recent years,
there has been a significant increase in freeze-out mergers, which are used as a
method for corporations to remove their shares from public markets (known as "go
ing private"). In earlier years when stock prices were high many firms "went public"
in order to take advantage of capital which was readily available, but with depressed
stock prices, the advantage seems to' be in buying back those shares, sold to the
public at high prices, at the current lower prices through freeze-out mergers or other
methods.

2.

380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).

3. While the court consistently refers to "majority stockholders," there seems
no reason to require that the stockholder have over 50% of the outstanding shares of
either corporation for the "valid business purpose" test to apply. Since considerably
less than 50% will usually give a stockholder operating control of a corporation, a
"contro\" stockholder is assumed to have the same duties and rights as a "majority"
stockholder. To conform to the court's language, this article will use the term "major
ity" but the reader should consider a control stockholder to be in the same position.
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cepted. 4 In the merger situation, the duty of majority stockholders
prior to Singer had been limited to the "entire fairness"5 of the
merger. This meant that as long as the majority had made full dis
closure of all facts and results of a proposed merger and had not
damaged the minority stockholders by payment of an inadequate
price for cancellation of their interests, the majority had discharged
its fiduciary duty. As recently as 1971,6 Delaware courts allowed
minority interests to be removed through merger without inves
tigating any underlying corporat~ purpose. More broadly, the

4. In'Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947), the majority stock
holder caused the board of directors to redeem one class of stock for cash as pro
vided in the corporate charter. Immediately thereafter, the majority caused the cor
poration to sell assets which were greatly undervalued on the company books. The
result was a windfall profit retained entirely by the majority stockholder. The holders
of t\1e redeemed class of stock were successful in showing that the majority had
breached a fiduciary duty owed to the minority. See also Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256
A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1969), afI'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v.
Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
The duty of majority stockholders has developed as an extension of the duty
owed to stockholders by directors which was based, in turn, on the majority stock
holders' effective control of the board of directors through their power to elect the
board.
On director's duty, see Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834 (Del. 1971) (corporate
opportunity usurped by a director); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Cq., 43 Del. Ch.
353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967) (improper stock issue reduced plaintiff's interest in cor
poration); Dolese Bros. Co. v. Brown, 39 Del. Ch. 1, 157 A.2d 784 (1960) (misuse of
corporate funds); Johnston v. Green, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (1956) (corpo
rate opportunity usurped); Bennet v. Breuil Petroleum Corp.; 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d
236 (1953) (plaintiff frozen-out by reorganization and sale of stock at an inadequate
price); Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (stock trading
on insider information); Italo-Petroleum Corp. v. Hannigan, 40 Del. 534, 14 A.2d 401
(1940) (request for accounting by directors).
• 5. The"entire fairness" test in an interested merger situation was first set out
in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107 109-10
(1952).
6. In David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch.
1971), the court said:
[P]laintiffs ... fail to recognize that under the law of merger each minority
stockholder of Schenley has had at least constructive notice that he may be
lawfully eliminated as such a stockholder unless the plan of corporate reor
ganization designed to absorb his stock interest is so grossly unfair as to be
invalid. In short, ... the rights of plaintiffs ... are not greater under the
present Delaware merger statute here involved [long-form merger) than
under the so-called short-merger 'statute . . . . Thus, if plaintiffs and others
are not satisfied with the value placed upon their shares by Glen Alden, and
no fraud or blatant over-reaching is demonstrated, their recourse is to an
appraisal ....
[d. at 35 (citations omitted).
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courts regarded judicial scrutiny of corporate motives as inappro
priate in most situations. 7
In the Singer case, North American Philips Corporation (North
American) decided to attempt to acquire the Magnavox Company
(Magnavox) by tender offer and subsequent merger. On August 21,
1974, North American incorporated North American Philips De
velopment Corporation (Development) for the purpose of making a
tender offer to the holders of outstanding shares of Magnavox. On
August 28, 1974, Development made an offer of eight dollars ($8)
per share to Magnavox's stockholders. The offer included full dis
closure both of Development's intent to ultimately acquire all
equity interest in Magnavox and of the effects of that acquisition on
Magnavox stockholders.
The directors of Magnavox opposed the tender offer primarily
because of inadequate price and so informed their stockholders.
The directors sent a letter to the stockholders which stated, in
part, that the " 'Company was shocked at the inadequacy of the of
fer of $8 per share in relationship to a book value in excess of $11
. . . .' "8 In September of 1974, Development and Magnavox com
promised on an offer of nine dollars ($9) per share with a two year
employment contract for each of sixteen officers of Magnavox. The
board of Magnavox then withdrew its opposition to the offer. As a
result of the tender offer, Development acquired 84.1% of the

7.
While a court of equity should stand ready to prevent corporate
fraud and any overreaching by fiduciaries of the rights of stockholders, Ben
nett v. Breuil, 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236, by the same token this Court
should not impede the consummation of an orderly merger under the Dela
ware statutes, an efficient and fair method having been furnished which per
mits a judicially protected withdrawal from a merger by a disgruntled stock
holder....
Id. at 36 (citation omitted). Also, in Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7,
187 A.2d 78 (1962), the court said:
Indeed it is difficult to imagine a case under the short merger statute in
which there could be such actual fraud as would entitle a minority to set
aside the merger. This is so because the very purpose of the statute is to
provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority
shareholder's interest in the enterprise. Thereafter the former stockholder
has only a monetary claim. This power of the parent corporation to eliminate
the minority is a complete answer to the plaintiff's charge of breach of trust
against the directors ....
Id. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80. In Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29
(1961), the court said: "[Tlhe reasons for a merger or the business necessity behind
it are not matters for judicial determination...." Id. at 82-83, 174 A.2d at 30 (citation
omitted).
8. 380 A.2d at 971.
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Magnavox common shares outstanding, putting it m control of
Magnavox.
In May of 1975, Development incorporated T.M.C. Develop
ment Corporation (TMC) for the purpose of acquiring the remain
ing 15.9% of Magnavox common shares through a merger of Mag
navox into TMC under the Dela~are long form merger statute. 9
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977) provides, in part, as
follows:
(a) Any 2 or more corporations existing under the laws of this State may
merge into a single corporation, which may be any 1 of the constituent corpo
rations or may consolidate into a new corporation formed by the consolida
tion, pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation, as the case may
be, complying and approved in accordance with this section.
(b) The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or
consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or
consolidation. The agreement shall state: (1) The terms and conditions of the
merger or consolidation; (2) the mode of carrying the same into effect; (3)
the amendments or changes in the certificate of incorporation of the surviv
ing corporation as are desired to be effected by the merger or consolidation,
or, if no such amendments or changes are desired, a statement that the cer
tificate of incorporation of 1 of the constituent corporations shall be the cer
tificate of incorporation of the surviving or resulting corporation; (4) the
manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into
shares or other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the
merger or consolidation and, if any shares of any of the constituent corpora
tions are not to be converted solely into shares or other securities of the
surviving or resulting corporation, the cash, property, rights or securities of
any other corporation which the holders of such shares are to receive in
exchange for, or upon conversion of such shares and the surrender of the
certificates evidencing them, which cash, property, rights or securities of any
other corporation may be in addition to or in lieu of shares or other se
curities of the surviving or resulting corporation; and (5) such other details
or provisions as are deemed desirable, including, without limiting the gen
erality of the foregoing, a provision for the payment of cash in lieu of the
issuance or recognition of fractional shares, interests or rights, or for any
other arrangement with respect thereto, consistent with the provisions of
§ 155 of this title. The agreement so adopted shall be executed in accordance
with § 103 of this title. Any of the terms of the agreement of merger or
consolidation may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside of
such agreement, provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate
upon the terms of the agreement is clearly and expressly set forth in the
agreement of merger or consolidation.
(c) The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section shall be
submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an annual or
special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement. Due notice of
the time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to each holder of
stock, whether voting or nonvoting, of the corporation at his address as it
appears on the records of the corporation, at least 20 days prior to the date of
the meeting. At the meeting, the agreement shall be considered and a vote
taken for its adoption or rejection. If a majority of the outstanding stock of
the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of
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The Magnavox directors agreed to a merger in which TMC would
be the surviving corporation and called a meeting of the stock
holders of Magnavox for July 24, 1975 to approve the merger. They
sent a proxy statement to the stockholders in June of 1975, again
with full disclosure of the ultimate effect of the merger on the
stockholders. At the stockholder's meeting the proposed merger
was approved.
The minority stockholders filed suit charging that the merger
was fraudulent since it lacked any business purpose other than a
freeze-out of the minority stockholders at an inadequate price. The
offer price was nine dollars ($9) as compared to a book value of ten
dollars and sixteen cents ($10.16) per share. 10 The minority also
alleged that the board had breached its fiduciary duty by approving
the merger at an inadequate price. The minority's final argument
was that the proxy statements violated the anti-fraud provision of
the Delaware securities act. l l Specifically, the minority stockhold
ers alleged that the proxy materials contained false and misleading
statements and failed to disclose material facts. They pointed out
that the proxy materials did not mention the Magnavox directors'
initial opposition to Development's tender offer, the substantial dif
ference between the book value of Magnavox shares and the offer
price, or the employment contracts offered to sixteen Magnavox
officers in return for the Magnavox board's support of the tender
offer. 12
The majority stockholders argued that their actions were fully
authorized by the Delaware long form merger statute and fully
complied with that act. The majority contended that the minority's

the agreement, that fact shall be certified on the agreement by the secretary
or assistant secretary of the corporation. If the agreement shall be so adopted
and certified by each constituent corporation, it shall then, in addition to the
execution required by subsection (b) of this section, be executed, acknowl
edged and filed and shall become effective, in accordance with § 103 of this
title. It shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county of this
State in which the registered office of each such constituent corporation is
located; or if any of the constituent corporations shall have been specially
created by a public act of the General Assembly, then the agreement shall
be recorded in the county where such corporation had its principal place of
business in this State....
10. 380 A.2d at 972.
11. While the anti-fraud provisions of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (Michie
1974), which require full disclosure of all material facts in proxy solicitations, were
argued in the case, they did not playa major part in the court's decision and are not
considered in this discussion.
12. 380 A.2d at 980 n,13.
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only available remedy was appraisal as provided by Delaware law, 13
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977) provides in part, as
follows:
(a) Appraisal rights under this section shall be available only for the
shares of any stockholder who has complied with subsection (b) of this sec
tion and has neither voted in favor of the merger nor consented thereto in
writing pursuant to § 228 of this title. When used in this section, the word
"stockholder" means a holder of record of stock in a stock corporation and
also a member of record of a non-stock corporation; the words "stock" and
"share" mean and include what is ordinarily meant by those words and also
membership or membership interest of a member of a nonstock corporation.
(b) Appraisal rights under this section shall be determined as follows:
(1) If a proposed merger or consolidation for which appraisal rights are
provided under this section is to be submitted for approval at a meeting of
stockholders, the corporation, not less than 20 days prior to the meeting,
shall notify each of its stockholders entitled to such appraisal rights that ap
praisal rights are available for any or all of the shares of the constituent
corporations, and shall include in such notice a copy of this section. Each
stockholder electing to demand the appraisal of his shares under this section
shall deliver to the corporation, before the taking of the vote on the merger
or consolidation, a written demand for appraisal of his shares. Such demand
will be sufficient if it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity of
the stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the ap
praisal of his shares; provided, however, that such demand must be in addi
tion to and separate from any proxy or vote against the merger. Within 10
days after the effective date of such merger or consolidation, the surviving
corporation shall notify each stockholder of each constituent corporation who
has complied with this subsection and has not voted in favor of or consented
to the merger or consolidation of the date that the merger or consolidation
has become effective; or
(2) If the merger or consolidation was approved pursuant to § 228 or
§ 253 of this title, the surviving corporation, either before the effective date
of the merger or within 10 days thereafter; shall notify each of the stockhold
ers entitled to appraisal rights of the effective date of the merger or con
solidation and that appraisal rights are available for any or all of the shares
of the constituent corporations. A copy of this section shall be included in
the notice. The notice shall be sent by certified or registered mail, return
receipt requested, addressed to the stockholder at his address as it appears
on the records of the corporation. Any stockholder entitled to appraisal rights
may, within 20 days after the date of mailing of the notice, demand in writ
ing from the surviving corporation the appraisal of his shares. Such demand
will be sufficient if it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity of
the stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the ap
praisal of his shares.
(f) After the determination of the stockholders entitled to an appraisal,

the Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger. Upon application by any stockholder entitled to participate in the
appraisal proceeding or by the corporation, the Court may, in its discretion,
permit discovery or other pretrial proceedings and may proceed to trial upon
the appraisal prior to the final determination of those other stockholders who
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which allows a stockholder, dissatisfied with the price he receives
for his or her shares, to demand a judicial appraisal of the fair value
of the shares. The majority denied any violation of the Delaware
anti-fraud statute and argued that even if it had made any misrep
resentations in the proxy materials the minority did not rely on any
such misrepresentations.
Since the board of Magnavox was not disinterested 14 and
would benefit personally from employment contracts and stock op
tions, the court could have used conventional principles to find a
violation of the board's fiduciary duty, unless the board was able to
prove the "entire fairness" of the merger. 15 Instead, the court took
this opportunity to announce that a corporate merger controlled on
both sides by the majority stockholders, even though fully in com
pliance with the merger provisions of Delaware law, must have
some "valid business purpose" other than the freeze-out of an un
wanted minority.16 The court admitted that this test is undefined
and "leads to questions such as, 'Whose purpose?' and 'What busi
ness?,' "17 but it did not answer those questions. As a concurring
opinion stated, "[t]he opinion waffies in its attempt to establish
guidelines for future merger litigation with emphasis on the coined
have complied with this section. Any stockholder whose name appears on
the list filed by the corporation pursuant to subsection (d) of this section and
who has submitted his certificates of stock to the Register in Chancery, if
such is required, may participate fully in all proceedings until the Court
shall determine that he is not entitled to appraisal rights under this section.
(g) The court shall direct the payment of the appraised value of the
shares, together with interest, if any, by the surviving or resulting corpora
tion to the stockholders entitled thereto upon the surrender to the corpora
tion of the certificates representing such stock....
(h) The costs of the proceeding may be determined by the Court and
taxed upon the parties as the Court deems equitable in the circumstances.
Upon the application of any party in interest, the Court shall determine the
amount of interest, if any, to be paid upon the value of the stock of the
stockholders entitled thereto. In making its determination with respect to
interest, the Court may consider all relevant factors, including the rate of
interest which the corporation has paid for money it has borrowed, if any,
during the pendency of the proceeding. Upon application of a stockholder,
the Court may order all or a portion of the expenses incurred by any stock
holder in connection with the appraisal proceeding, including, without limi
tation, reasonable attorney's fees and the fees and expenses of experts, to be
charged pro rata against the value of all of the shares entitled to an appraisal.
14. At the time of the merger vote, four of the Magnavox directors were also on
the North American board and three more had employment contracts and options on
North American stock as of the effective date of the merger.
15. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
16. 380 A.2d at 978-79.
17. rd. at 976.
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phrase 'business purpose' which standing alone connotes nothing
magic or definitive. "18
The earlier decisions which enunciated the "entire fairness"
standard 19 are still good law. They are supplemented by, but do
not conflict with, the new "valid business purpose" test. As the
"entire fairness" test developed, the parties objecting to the
merger were required to prove such unfairness in the merger as to
amount to constructive fraud. 20 Later, the courts required the par
ties proposing the merger to prove the "entire fairness" of the
merger when they were in control on both sides. 21 By requiring
that some identifiable benefit must be gained by the freeze-out
merger process other than the elimination of an unwanted minority
interest, the "valid business purpose" test appears to be a further
development of the duty imposed upon majority stockholders to
deal fairly with minority stockholders.22 "Entire fairness" and "valid

18. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 422 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E1, E8 (Del. 1977)
(McNeilly, J., concurring) (quoted paragraph omitted from Atlantic Reporter).
19. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch.
1968); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
20. MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943).
21. Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1969), aiI'd, 278 A.2d 467
(Del. 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch.
1968).
22. The result reached in Singer is the same result that the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reached both in Marshel v. A.F.W. Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277
(2d Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 881 (1976), and in Greene v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc.,
533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), by using rule 10(b)(5) (17
C.F.R. 240.10(b)(5) (1975)) and § lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C.A. 78(j)(b) (1970)). The court held that rule 1O(b)(5) was broad enough to reach
the breach of a fiduciary duty in the absence of any actual fraud. In Marshel, which
involved a cash-out merger under New York law, the court held that it was a viola
tion of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 1O(b)(5) to
consummate a cash-out merger with no corporate purpose other than removal of the
minority, since it involved a forced sale at a price determined by the majority and
funded from the corporate treasury, regardless of appraisal rights and specifically did
not decide the state law issues.
Greene involved a short form merger under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253
(Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977), where all statutory requirements were met. The court
held that rule 1O(b)(5) regards a freeze-out merger without a justifiable business pur
pose and with low stock valuation and no notice to the minority as a fraud regardless
of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure, which need not be proven. On appeal the
Supreme Court held that rule 1O(b)(5) does not regulate the standard of fiduciary
conduct because the area of corporate responsibility of majority stockholders is prop
erly regulated by the states. The Supreme Court concluded that rule 1O(b)(5) does
not apply in the absence of "manipulative or deceptive" practices which are terms of
art referring to practices intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Greene, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). For other cases inter
preting rule 1O(b)(5) in this area, see Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972);
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business purpose now represent a two-step test which must be
satisfied to justify a freeze-out merger.
Although the Delaware Code authorizes appraisal of the shares
of a minority stockholder who is dissatisfied with the price offered,
the statute does not say that appraisal is an exclusive remedy for
frozen-out minority stockholders. The courts have, however,
applied the appraisal remedy as though it were exclusive. 23 In
some of the earlier appraisal cases the courts differentiated be
tween mergers under the Delaware long form merger statute and
the short form merger statute 24 on the basis of the statutory lanAlbright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974); Levine v. Biddle Sawyer
Corp., 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp.
1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
23. David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch.
1971) (appraisal held adequate remedy in freeze-out merger); Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 202, 178 A.2d 311, af!'d, 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962)
(short form merger); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107
(1952) (question of valuation in a "stock for stock" merger); Federal United Corp. v.
Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940) (appraisal applied to loss of dividend
rights by preferred stockholder in merger).
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977) provides, in part,
as follows:
(a) In any case in which at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each
class of the stock of a corporation or corporations is owned by another corpo
ration and 1 of the corporations is a corporation of this State and the other or
others are corporations of this State or any other state or states or the District
of Columbia and the laws of the other state or states or the District permit a
corporation of such jurisdiction to merge with a corporation of another juris
diction, the corporation having such stock ownership may either merge the
other corporation or corporations into itself and assume all of its or their
obligations, or merge itself, or itself and 1 or more of such other corpora
tions, into 1 of the other corporations by executing, acknowledging and fil
ing, in accordance with § 103 of this title, a certificate of such ownership
and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution of its board of directors to
so merge and the date of the adoption; provided, however, that in case the
parent corporation shall not own all the outstanding stock of all the sub
sidiary corporations, parties to a merger as aforesaid, the resolution of the
board of directors of the parent corporation shall state the terms and condi
tions of the merger, including the securities, cash, property, or rights to be
issued, paid, delivered or granted by the surviving corporation upon surren
der of each share of the subsidiary corporation or corporations not owned by
the parent corporation. If the parent corporation be not the surviving corpo
ration, the resolution shall include provision for the pro rata issuance of
stock of the surviving corporation to the holders of the stock of the parent
corporation on surrender of the certificates therefor, and the certificate of
ownership and merger shall state that the proposed merger has been ap
proved by a majority of the outstanding stock of the parent corporation enti
tled to vote thereon at a meeting duly called and held after 20 days notice of
the purpose of the meeting mailed to each such stockholder at his address as
it appears on the records of the corporation. A certified copy of the certifi
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guage. The courts reasoned that the short form merger statute au
thorized the freeze-out merger while the long form statute did not
and, therefore,' that appraisal was the exclusive remedy only for
short form mergers. 25 In 1968, the Delaware legislature amended
the long form merger statute, effectively eliminating this differ
ence. 26 The amendment to the Delaware long form merger statute
indicates a legislative intent to facilitate payment of cash for minor
ity shares at the discretion of the boards of directors controlling the
merger. The court in Singer, however, apparently chose to ignore
the legislative intent behind the 1968 amendment. The court held
that the payment of cash for shares is not solely at the discretion of
the board and added the restriction of a "valid business purpose" to
the usual restriction that the price paid for shares be fair.
. The result in Singer is beneficial to minority stockholders who
frequently consider the appraisal remedy inadequate since their
purpose for owning shares is defeated by a cash payment even if
the price received is fair. For instance, some stockholders believe
that the stock will rise in value and that a cash payment deprives
them of future gains. Others count on their shares for retirement
income from dividends. A forced cash payment means the end of
that income and possible future hardship.
The Singer decision clearly indicates that the appraisal rem
edy, long thought to be exclusive, is merely one among many
available to the courts. The court specifically said that it "may grant
such relief as it deems appropriate under the circumstances. "27
Since the action involved in a suit by minority stockholders to
vindicate their rights in an unfair merger is equitable in nature,
cate shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in this State
in which the registered office of each constituent corporation which is a cor
poration of this State is located....
(d) In the event all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation
party to a merger effected under this section is not owned by the parent
corporation immediately prior to the merger, the stockholders of the sub
sidiary Delaware corporation party to the merger shall have appraisal rights
and the surviving corporation shall comply with paragraph (2) of subsection
(b) of § 262 of this title. Thereafter, the surviving corporation and the stock
holders shall have such rights and duties and shall follow the procedures
set forth in subsections (c) to (j), inclusive, of § 262 of this title.
25. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 202, 178 A.2d 311, aff'd, 41
Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962). At the time the chancery court decided Stauffer, § 251
allowed for payment of cash "in lieu of issuance of fractional shares of the resulting
or surviving corporation." See 50 Del. Laws ch. 467, § 4 (effective July 18, 1955).
26. 56 Del. Laws ch. 186, § 16 (effective Jan. 2, 1968).
27. 380 A.2d at 980.
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possible remedies include injunction or unraveling an accomplished
me.rger. On the other hand, if the merger has a "valid business
purpose," or if the" unfairness found in the merger relates solely to
price paid to frozen-out stockholders, the appraisal remedy is
adequate and is presumed to be exclusive.
One month after its decision in Singer, the Delaware Supreme
Court reviewed the "valid business purpose" test in Tanzer v. In
ternational General Industries, Inc. 28 There, International General
Industries (IGI) owned 81% of the outstanding common stock of
Kliklok Corporation (Kliklok). On September 30, 1975, IGI formed
KLK Corporation (KLK) in order to merge KLK with Kliklok. The
boards of each of the corporations approved the merger plan and
stockholder approval was obtained as required under the Delaware
long form merger statute. Minority stockholders, dissenting from
the propsed merger, asked the court of chancery for a preliminary
injunction, arguing that the sole purpose of the merger was to
serve the interest of IGI by freezing-out the minority. The majority
responded that the merger was proposed because it would facilitate
long-term financing of IGI and that facilitation of financing was a
sufficient "business purpose." The court of chancery29 refused the
injunction and a motion by the defendants for summary judgment.
The minority appealed. By the time the case reached the Supreme
Court of Delaware, the merger had been accomplished. The Su
preme Court of Delaware stated the issue to be decided:
Plaintiffs' argument amounts to this: a freeze-out merger
imposed on a subsidiary corporation by a parent, and designed
solely for the purpose of benefiting the parent, is impermissible
under Delaware law. Defendants, on the other hand, contend
that the merger was for a valid business reason and is permissible
under [the Delaware long form merger statute]; in addition,
they say that the price offered in connection with the merger is
intrinsically fair. 30

In Tanzer, the court reviewed the Singer decision noting that
"Singer determines that a cash-out of minority stockholders, when
that is the sole purpose of a merger, is a violation of a fiduciary duty
owed to them by a majority stockholder. "31 The court then turned
to the Singer court's "valid business purpose" language and found

28. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
29. [d. at 1122.
30. [d. at 1123.
31. [d.
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it ambiguous. The Tanzer court observed that the phrase "valid
business purpose" is not descriptive of the actual interest-weighing
test to be applied. 32 It suggested that what is really involved is a
balancing of the right of majority stockholders to vote their own in
terest against the duty of those same stockholders to minority stock
holders.33 After balancing IGI's interest in facilitating long-term
debt financing against its duty to Kliklok's minority stockholders,
the court stated that the purpose established by IGI was a bona fide
purpose for the merger. 34
While the court in Tanzer moved away from the "valid busi
ness purpose" language of Singer, Tanzer nevertheless supports the
view that corporate motives underlying freeze-out mergers are to
be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Once the concept of a "valid busi
ness purpose" has been more clearly defined through case law,
that test will become more focused. The "valid business purpose"
concept should then be a helpful clarification of the fiduciary duty
of a majority stockholder in the merger situation.
Now that the Delaware courts have articulated the "valid busi
ness purpose" test, one must attempt to predict what the courts
will find acceptable as "valid business purposes." In Tanzer, al
though the court did not define what purposes other than facilita
tion of long-term debt financing will be acceptable, any bona fide
purpose of the majority should be sufficient to support the majority's
right to vote its own interest even if minority interests are dam
aged. Valid purposes would include streamlining of the corpo
rate structure in order to eliminate duplication of jobs and thereby
increase profits, mergers to gain tax benefits, and any other pur
pose which can be shown to have a beneficial effect on either cor
poration involved in the merger. Some purposes clearly will not
support that right. 35 Where a majority seeks to justifY its actions on
32. [d.
33. For cases discussing the right of a majority stockholder to vote her own
interest, see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Comb. Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del.
Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947); Heil v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 17 Del. Ch. 214, 151
A. 303 (1930); Allied Chern. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A.
486 (1923).
34. 379 A.2d at 1125. The court then remanded the case for an "entire fairness"
hearing as required by Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d
107 (1952).
35. In recent years the literature has suggested a number of possible purposes,
some of which may be invalid in the future. Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New
Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974); Comment, Protection of Minority
Shareholders from Freeze-outs Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421 (1976);
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the basis of one purpose while its real purpose is either to elimi
nate a dissident minority or to enrich itself at the expense of a
minority stockholder, the courts will undoubtedly look to the true
motive. Even if the use of the business purpose language disap
pears through judicial disapproval in cases like Tanzer, the concept
of a "valid business purpose" is sound as long as the courts remain
concerned with the underlying reasons for freeze-out mergers.
The rule of Singer and Tanzer is more demanding than the
"business judgment" rule,36 which provides only that if corporate
boards act in good faith the courts will not question the wisdom of
. the boards' decisions. In practice, this often leads courts to take a
hands-off attitude towards the boards' actions. The more intensive
review required by Singer and Tanzer, although developed and
discussed in the context of freeze-out mergers, can be applied to
other methods by which corporations "go private," such as reverse
stock splits, short form mergers,37 stock repurchase programs, and
asset sales.
While the final effect of the Singer/Tanzer rule is not yet clear,
it is safe to say that it will be significant. Forty percent of the
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorpo
rated in Delaware, and therefore subject to Delaware law. It has
been estimated that over 200 of the FORTUNE 500 Largest Indus
trial Corporations are incorporated in Delaware. 38 Since the
Singer/Tanzer rule grew out of the tension between the common
law fiduciary duty of directors and control stockholders ~d the
right of those same directors and control stockholders to vote their
own interests when voting their shares, application of the rule
should not be limited to Delaware corporations. If other states
adopt the Singer/Tanzer rule as a way of balancing the competing

Note, Goillg Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975). Some purposes, such as escape from
disclosure requirements, are objectionable on policy grounds, while others, such as
removal of pressure from management to show high profits in spite of long range
negative effects, are more valid. Only time, and a case by case development in the
courts, will tell.
36. 379 A.2d at 1124.
37. The court, in both Sillger and Tanzer, was concerned with the Delaware
long form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977).
Although the S illger decision was specifically restricted to long form mergers, the
Delaware Court of Chancery has since held that the SillgerlTanzer rule also applies
to short form mergers, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977).
Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977).
38. Jennings, Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31
Bus. LAw. 991 (1976).
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interests of majority and minority shareholders when public corpo
rations "go private," the "valid business purpose" approach may
soon become the majority rule. 39

Allan A. Campbell, Jr.
39. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the same result in
Greene v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). This indicates a judiciarbelief that the Singer/Tanzer rule is equitable. The
Supreme Court, in reversing the Second Circuit, did not find the result incorrect.
The Court instead criticized the method of reaching the result. See note 22 supra.

